|
Digital
Library of the European Council for Modelling
and Simulation |
Title: |
Blind Vs. Embedded Indirect
Reciprocity And The Evolution Of Cooperation |
Authors: |
Simone
Righi, Karoly Takacs |
Published in: |
(2017).ECMS 2017 Proceedings
Edited by: Zita Zoltay Paprika, Péter Horák, Kata Váradi, Péter Tamás
Zwierczyk, Ágnes Vidovics-Dancs, János Péter Rádics European Council for Modeling and Simulation. doi:10.7148/2017 ISBN:
978-0-9932440-4-9/ ISBN:
978-0-9932440-5-6 (CD) 31st European Conference on Modelling and
Simulation, Budapest, Hungary, May 23rd
– May 26th, 2017 |
Citation
format: |
Simone
Righi, Karoly Takacsi (2017). Blind Vs. Embedded Indirect Reciprocity And The
Evolution Of Cooperation, ECMS 2017 Proceedings Edited by: Zita Zoltay
Paprika, Péter Horák, Kata Váradi, Péter Tamás Zwierczyk, Ágnes
Vidovics-Dancs, János Péter Rádics European Council for Modeling and
Simulation. doi: 10.7148/2017-0060 |
DOI: |
https://doi.org/10.7148/2017-0060 |
Abstract: |
The
evolution of cooperation is one of the fundamental problems of both social
sciences and biology. It is difficult to explain how a large extent of
cooperation could evolve if individual free riding always provides higher
benefits and chances of survival. In absence of direct reciprocation, it has
been suggested that indirect reciprocity could potentially solve the problem
of large scale cooperation. In this paper, we
compare the chances of two forms of indirect reciprocity with each other: a
blind one that rewards any partner who did good to previous partners, and an
embedded one that conditions cooperation on good acts towards common
acquaintances. We show that these two versions of indirect reciprocal
strategies are not very different from each other in their efficiency. We
also demonstrate that their success very much relies on the speed of
evolution: their chances for survival are only present if evolutionary
updates are not frequent. Robustness tests are provided for various forms of
biases. |
Full
text: |