|
Digital
Library of the European Council for Modelling
and Simulation |
Title: |
Modelling Preference Ties And Equal Treatment Policy |
Authors: |
Kolos Cs.
Agoston, Peter Biro |
Published in: |
(2017).ECMS 2017 Proceedings
Edited by: Zita Zoltay Paprika, Péter Horák, Kata Váradi, Péter Tamás
Zwierczyk, Ágnes Vidovics-Dancs, János Péter Rádics European Council for Modeling and Simulation. doi:10.7148/2017 ISBN:
978-0-9932440-4-9/ ISBN:
978-0-9932440-5-6 (CD) 31st European Conference on Modelling and
Simulation, Budapest, Hungary, May 23rd
– May 26th, 2017 |
Citation
format: |
Kolos
Cs. Agoston, Peter Biro (2017).Modelling Preference
Ties And Equal Treatment Policy, ECMS 2017 Proceedings Edited by: Zita Zoltay
Paprika, Péter Horák, Kata Váradi, Péter Tamás Zwierczyk, Ágnes
Vidovics-Dancs, János Péter Rádics European Council for Modeling and
Simulation. doi: 10.7148/2017-0516 |
DOI: |
https://doi.org/10.7148/2017-0516 |
Abstract: |
The college admission problem (CAP) has been studied
extensively in the last 65 years by mathematicians, computer scientists and
economists following the seminal paper of Gale and Shapley (1962). Their basic
algorithm, the so called deferred acceptance
mechanism always returns a student optimal stable matching in linear time,
and it is indeed widely used in practice. However, there can be some special features which may require significant adjustments on this
algorithm, or the usage of other techniques, in order to satisfy all the
objectives of the decision maker. The college admissions problem with ties
and equal treatment policy is solvable with an extension of the Gale and
Shapley algorithm, but, if there are further constraints, such as lower
quotas, there exist no efficient way to find a stable solution. Both of these
features are present in the Hungarian higher education matching scheme and a
simple heuristic is used to compute the cuto |
Full
text: |